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The neural mechanisms underlying deci-
sion making have often been probed by
asking subjects to choose between move-
ments (e.g., making a saccade to a left or
right target) (Sugrue et al., 2005). In
studying decisions, the influence of so-
called “top-down” factors such as reward
magnitude, reward probability, andmoti-
vation are of fundamental interest and
importance. Unfortunately, these param-
eters are much more difficult to quantify
and modulate empirically than are
“bottom-up” factors such as contrast and
luminance. In their recent article in The
Journal of Neuroscience,Milstein andDor-
ris (2007) studied the effect of expected
value (the product of reward magnitude
and probability) on saccadic control. This
work builds on the saccadic decision liter-
ature, the vast majority of which is based
on investigations on nonhuman primate
brains (Schall, 2001; Ikeda, 2003).
Milstein and Dorris (2007) instructed
human participants to fixate a central spot
and then make a saccadic eye movement
to a red target which appeared after a 400
ms blank screen (Fig. 1) [Milstein and
Dorris (2007), their Fig. 1 (http://www.
jneurosci . org / cgi / content / full / 27 / 18 /
4810/F1)]. A monetary reward for a cor-
rect saccade was then displayed. The
magnitude of the reward was dependent
on the side of the target and varied
across blocks of trials. The probability of
the target appearing on the left or right
was fixed for each block but also varied
independently across blocks. The aim
was to investigate whether saccadic
preparation toward a particular target
was influenced by the expected value of
that location.
Saccadic reaction time (SRT) was
measured as a conventional index of
preparation. In addition, the authors
used a relatively novel probe to interro-
gate saccadic preparation before target
presentation, by presenting a distractor
halfway through the warning period, af-
ter 200 ms (Fig. 1A) (30% of trials).
These were green, rather than red, but
were otherwise identical to real targets
and served to trigger erroneous saccades
termed “oculomotor capture.” The un-
derlying assumption was that a certain
amount of saccadic preparedness must
already have been reached if distractors
were able to bring the planning circuitry
to saccade threshold (Theeuwes, 1999).
No reward was given on trials in which
oculomotor capture occurred, so there
was an incentive to avoid saccades to
distractors.
The authors demonstrated a remark-
ably clear effect on SRT. A significant
negative correlation between expected
value and reaction time was found. The
greater the reward associated with a par-
ticular movement was, the shorter the
SRT was. Impressively, the distractor
trials also demonstrated a significant
bias of oculomotor captures toward the
side of higher expected value. However,
there may be several causes for this bias.
One confound which could explain the
effect, on both targets and distractors, is
that of attention. If attention toward a
location of higher expected value is in-
creased, then a lower threshold (and
shorter SRT) might occur. The authors
concede that their task is not suitable for
teasing apart saccadic preparation and
visuospatial attention mechanisms. It
therefore remains to be determined
whether the effect of value here is pri-
marily on the motor system.
Another question regarding the ef-
fects generated by distractors is the na-
ture of the bottom-up effect of color.
The authors did not examine how reli-
ably subjects distinguished between red
targets and green distractors at the reti-
nal eccentricity used on this task. More-
over, the novelty or salience of the green
distractor may influence attentional
bias and thus interact with value.
Clearly, more investigation is required
to delineate the relative contributions of
prior expected value versus the alloca-
tion of spatial attention to the prepara-
tion of motor commands. This could be
examined using same-colored distrac-
tors so that the discrimination was tem-
poral and/or spatial only, rather than
determined by a combination of cues.
In these experiments, dual-target trials
(Fig. 1B) (10%) were used to assess moti-
vation because the authors were con-
cerned that a delayed financial reward
might not sufficiently influence saccadic
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preparation. Milstein and Dorris (2007)
found a choice bias toward the high-
magnitude target, confirming the salience
of reward magnitude as a variable. These
trials may have additional significance,
discussed later.
The second experiment investigates
the spatial representation of expected
value. An array of distractor locations
(Fig. 2A) was used to map the probability
of oculomotor capture as a function of
distance from the target site (Fig. 2B)
[Milstein and Dorris (2007), their Figs. 1
(http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/
full/27/18/4810/F1), 3 (http://www.
jneurosci.org/cgi/content/full/27/18/
4810/F3), 6 (http://www.jneurosci.org/
cgi/content/full/27/18/4810/F6), 8
(http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/
full/27/18/4810/F8)]. The data from
these saccades was used to create heat or
contour maps, which the authors sug-
gest might represent the actual oculo-
motor/retinotopic mapping of expected
value, comprising a dynamic neural
field. Their inference here is that behav-
ioral output can be mapped directly to a
neuronal representation of value in
space (Fig. 2C). The authors conclude
that expected value is an important fac-
tor in saccadic preparation. However,
the conditions under which expected
value, rather than direction probability
or reward value asymmetry, determines
saccade preparation are still unclear. In-
terestingly, oculomotor capture de-
pended on probability of a target but
not reward magnitude asymmetry. On
dual target trials, however, choice bias
depended on the reward magnitude but
not on the probability asymmetries. In
contrast, SRTs to standard targets were
influenced by both parameters and were
therefore compatible with the expected
value hypothesis. The results are diffi-
cult to explain without two independent
representations for reward magnitude
and probability. The authors reasonably
infer that the competition in dual-target
trials reduces the effect of probability,
and that value may have its effect mainly
by adjusting the gain of the visual
inputs.
If this is the case, we would expect that
when reward direction conflicts with
probability, the dual-target choice SRT
would be prolonged for the more com-
mon saccades to the rare but rewarded
side, because this involves canceling a sac-
cadic program compared with less fre-
quent saccades to the unrewarded but
more probable side.
An alternative explanation is that dur-
ing the early stage of saccadic preparation,
oculomotor maps contain only informa-
tion about the probability of a target at
each location (prior probability). The re-
ward magnitudes are then incorporated
gradually during the preparatory period.
Accordingly, Ding and Hikosaka (2007)
have very recently found that the effect of
reward accumulates gradually during the
course of a single trial’s “foreperiod” (the
time between fixation and target presen-
tation). It is an empirical question as to
whether oculomotor capture also exhibits
sensitivity to reward later on in the fore-
period. If it does, this model would also
explain why capture by distractors 200ms
before the expected target onset was less
affected by reward magnitude than was
the target SRT or the dual-target bias. It
could also explain the fact that SRT (de-
termined after reward magnitude has
been incorporated during the preparatory
period) depends on both probability and
value magnitude. A separate competitive
process is needed to explain why choice
between two simultaneous targets de-
pends on their reward values rather than
their prior probabilities.
In summary, Milstein and Dorris
(2007) have demonstrated a clear effect of
Figure 1. A, Subjects fixated a red central target. After a 400ms blank period, a rewarded target appeared on the left or right
withaprobability distribution that remained constant for eachblock. For 60%of the trials, this is all that occurred.On30%of trials,
a green distractor was presented in one of four locations (here illustrated by open circles), halfway through thewaiting period (at
200ms). Two of these locationswere identical to the target locations. The other twowere in themidline, above and below center.
Saccades to the target were rewarded unless an intervening oculomotor capture (saccade to the distractor) had occurred. B,
Additional dual-target trials (10%)were presented inwhich subjects chose to saccade either to the left or right location (bottom).
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expected reward value on the latency of
responses to visual targets in humans,
building on previous studies in nonhu-
man primates (Ikeda, 2003). The interest-
ing measure of preparation revealed
through the oculomotor capture probe
immediately suggests several possible
mechanisms, including the dynamic neu-
ral field model that the authors suggest. It
also raises many interesting questions re-
garding the linkage between reward, ac-
tion control, and attention. More work in
humans and animal models will ulti-
mately demonstrate which model best
represents how value influences the pro-
gramming of saccades.
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Figure 2. A, In experiment 2, more distractor locations were used to map the efficacy of capture by distractors. Two (5 5)
grids of possible distractor locationswere used (50 total locations). The center of each represented the real target location.B, The
proportion of oculomotor captures decreased as a linear function of absolute distance of the distractor from the target. The
gradient of the function decreased with decreasing expected value. C, The locations of distractors and the number of erroneous
saccadesmade to themwere used to develop contourmaps of the oculomotor capturesmade at each location. Here, the expected
target is to the left with a relative expected value of 0.99.
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